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HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

Translated from the second volume of HEGEL'S *ÆSTHETICS*, by Miss S. A. LONGWELL.

CHIVALRY.—III. *Fidelity*.

The third sentiment that it is necessary to notice, as expressing the romantic subjectivity in the circle of social life, is Fidelity. By fidelity we have to understand neither the fidelity to a promise of love, nor the constancy in friendship of which Achilles and Patroklos were most beautiful examples, as were also Orestes and Pylades in the still more intimate tie that united them. Friendship, in this sense of the word, develops itself especially in youth. Every man has his own way to make in the world—a rank, a social position, to obtain and to preserve. Now, in youth, individuals live in a general indefiniteness as to their actual relations, and combine so closely in one view, one purpose and active endeavor, that through this union every undertaking of the one becomes at the same time the undertaking of the other. This is no longer the case in the friendships of mature age. The man follows, in his social relations, a more independent course; he does not allow himself to be led into so close a friendship that he could accomplish nothing without the other. Men meet and separate again; their interests and pursuits sometimes accord and sometimes are diverse; friendship, fervor of sentiment, conformity of principles and of general tendency remain, but it is not the friendship of youth, in which neither determines and undertakes anything which may not immediately concern the other. It pertains essentially to the principle of our deeper life that in the totality every one cares for himself, i.e. each one possesses essential aims for himself.

(a) Now, if Fidelity in friendship and love exists only between equals, yet Fidelity, as we have to consider it, pertains to a superior, a lord, a sovereign. We have already found something similar among the ancients, in the fidelity of servants to the family, to the house of their master. The most beautiful example of this is offered by the swineherd of Ulysses, who exposes himself at night and in storm to guard the herd, full of anxiety concerning the fate of his lord, to

whom he finally renders faithful aid against the wooers of Penelope. Shakespeare shows us the picture of a similar and not less touching fidelity in *King Lear*, Act I., Scene. 4.

Lear says to Kent, who wishes to serve him, "Dost thou know me, worthy fellow?" "No, sir; but you have that in your countenance which I would fain call master," answered Kent. This approaches very near the character that determines romantic fidelity. For fidelity, in the phase that we are considering, is not the fidelity of the servant and slave, which certainly may be beautiful and touching, yet wants the free self-dependence of the individuality, personal aims and endeavors, and is consequently inferior.

What we, on the contrary, have before us, is the feudatory fidelity of chivalry, by which the subject, in spite of his yielding to a superior, to a prince, king or emperor, preserves his free self-dependence as a predominant moment throughout. Yet this fidelity occupies an elevated place in the world of chivalry, because in it is comprehended the chief force of the commonwealth and its social order, at least in its origin.

(b) This sentiment, notwithstanding its superiority as a social principle to that which had preceded it, resembles not at all the patriotism that has for an end a general interest. It addresses itself only to the individual, to the lord, and therefore is again limited through the personal honor, the particular interest, the subjective intention. Fidelity appears in its greatest brilliancy in a society not yet regularly constituted, semi-barbarous, without the dominion of law or justice. In such a lawless state of society the most powerful, the most ambitious, place themselves as firm centres, as leaders, as princes, while others gather about them from free choice. Such a relation developed later into a more positive legal state of lord and vassal, under which every vassal demands for himself his rights and privileges. But the fundamental principle upon which the whole, in its origin, rests, is free choice, as well in reference to the subject of dependence as well as in the constancy in this dependence. So chivalric fidelity knows very well how to maintain its advantages and its rights, the personal independence and honor of the individual, and is not therefore recognized as a duty which as such might oppose the contingent will of the subject. On

the contrary, every individual makes his constancy, and thereby the permanency of universal order, dependent upon his pleasure, inclination, and personal disposition.

(c) Fidelity and obedience to the lord may therefore come very easily into collision with subjective passion, the sensitiveness to honor, the susceptibility of taking offence, the sentiment of love, and with many special inner and outer contingencies, and consequently become something highly precarious. A knight e.g. is faithful to his prince, but his friend becomes involved in a dispute with this prince; then he must immediately choose between the one and the other form of fidelity, and he may be especially faithful to his own honor and to his own interest. We have the finest example of such a collision in *The Cid*. He is faithful to the king, and just as true to himself. When the king acts justly, he lends him his arm; yet when the prince does wrong, or Cid is injured, he withdraws his support. Also the nobles of Charles the Great exhibit the same relation. There is a union of command and obedience just such as that we have already learned to recognize between Jupiter and the other divinities; the chief commands, blusters, and disputes, but the self-dependent powerful individuals oppose him when and how they please. This loose and dissoluble union is depicted most truly and gracefully in *Reynard the Fox*. As in the poem the *grandeeds* of the kingdom in reality serve only themselves and maintain their individual interests, so the German knights and princes in the Middle Ages were not at ease if they were obliged to do anything for the general interest or for their emperor; and it appears as if the Middle Ages were exalted on that account, because in such a state every one is justified, and a man of honor in following his own will—a thing which cannot be allowed in a rationally organized civil life.

In all these three phases—Honor, Love, and Fidelity—the foundation is the independence of the subject, the disposition of the heart that is ever opening to wider and deeper interests and that remains in harmony with these interests. This is in romantic art the most beautiful division of the circle which is found outside of religion as such. Here all has, for an immediate end, the human, with which we can sympa-

thize, and we do not find, as is frequently the case in the religious field, the subject, as well as the mode of manifestation, in collision with our ideas. But just as fully may these sentiments be brought into manifold relations with religion as religious interests are now intertwined with those of secular chivalry, as e.g. the adventures of the Knights of the Round Table in the search for the holy Graal. This combination introduces in chivalric poetry much that is mystical and fantastic, and also much that is allegorical. Likewise the worldly sphere of love, honor, and fidelity, may manifest itself quite independent of the deeper complication with religious aims and sentiments, and only exhibit the intrinsic emotions of the soul in its more personal and human subjectivity. Yet what the present phase still lacks is the realization of this subjectiveness with the concrete meaning of human relations, character, passion, and of real life generally. This manifold concrete world of human interests and passions remains standing in antithesis to that self-involved infinite depth of feeling which is empty of content and formal, and therefore offers as its problem the question how it shall take up this material so heterogeneous and all-containing, and present it elaborated in a more artistic manner.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.

BOOK II.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN REGARD TO THE PRACTICAL FACULTY.

CHAPTER IV.

RECAPITULATION.—Let us recapitulate all we have said hitherto.

I. The one fundamental life presupposed by us represents itself in its unity. It represents itself, places itself before itself in a sketch or scheme.

II. This representation is contradistinguished from another self-representation—which in the same way is not a unity,